Let us try once more to get this insanely simple argument down.
1) We are commonly given a solid sense of reality by which we may reliably maneuver in the world.
2) Sometimes things can happen which present a difficulty for this sense of reality e.g. I am focused on various synchronistic phenomena owing to having reread the Cosmic Trigger -for those who do not know this work, key elements are Sirius, its reference as a Dog star and the number 23. I then, with others decide on the philosophy forum reading from next weeks; this is to be chapter 10 of Deleuze and Guattari’s Thousand Plateau’s. It so turns out -to my surprise- not only is this on page 232 but that it also features a plate of a dog person. I duly register this as a synchronistic phenomena. A secondary phenomena occurs one day later in a John Holt education book in which only a few pages in I encounter an experiment featuring 23 people and the word SPECTRA on the same page (the name of the being Geller was in touch with apparently). Maybe not quite with the same force, but this still triggers my attention in the same way.
3) If I accept that the world is a 3d spatio temporal framework of a certain materialist cast, I can write this experience off as coincidence and reality selection.
4) But in order to make a judgement of certainty at this level I need stronger epistemic relation than is ordinarily required. Following Wittgenstein, we can only make sense of ‘doubt’ where we can ‘know’. Ordinarily I do not doubt the world in its solidity, the grammar of the word does not arise from here. However faced with this instance (the synchronistic event) in order to know in the strong sense that the perceived synchronistic event was not ‘real’ I would have to know how reality is ‘really’ working. Hence a second kind of knowledge is required, one more akin to Cartesian certainty. It is more akin to this because the Cartesian criteria ask us to reflect upon our individual perception of the world and not to allow ourselves the presuppositions of a really existing world that will continue to behave in the way it previously did. The relevant point being that the solid regularity of it is actually in question here. Yet I have to have certainty that there is no room in ‘reality’ (which here is used to mean existence as it actually is) for some kind of rearrangement of the world in order to know that the rearrangement option has no validity to it. As such my cognitive relation to the world must be able to easily refute any arguments against the synchronistic version. I find however that with the requisite level of certainty I am unable to discount notions such as ‘how can you be sure that reality did not simply rearrange itself?’ or that speculative notions like the ‘multiverse’ or ‘reality tunnels’ are not reasonable descriptions of the phenomenon. I can in fact, only appeal to the solidity of the world as I originally found it and the science commensurate to that solid approach in order to refute this claim. But this attitude does not help in this instance for such approaches are predicated only on the solidity of reality. All the knowledge has been generated from subject’s reporting only on this aspect. Thus there can be no refutation by appeal to this knowledge, it is just the dry reiteration that things are not really like that and an appeal to reality selection and coincidence.
5) Any other possible explanations for the anomalous event means i) either the solid reality view isn’t random (i.e. there was a connection between the phenomenon and the subject but rather at the level of predetermination) or ii) that there is something amiss with the solid view of reality and that the putative solidity, despite being dutiful reliable, is in fact subject to a kind of rearrangement not coherent to our ordinary way of looking at the world. This incoherent possibility is not one possibility but rather an open plurality of possibilities (speculations).
6) In short, because of the nature of the conundrum the synchronicity presents, I do not have access to any ordinary relation to the world to tell myself of its non-reality.
7) Hence I must just choose to believe the solid picture over the non-solid or determinate picture. Hence both responses are rational (or irrational) because neither are grounded in any greater certainty. The consistent solidity of the world is not an argument to tell me that sometimes it does not behave in that manner and indeed in the synchronisitic instance I have before me good evidence to the contrary.
8) Equally I would be foolish if I did not listen to the coincidence picture but in listening to it I must be careful not to buy into it just because it is the explanation I am given. Statistically it might make sense but this is not a guarantee of its truth.
9) The resultant, essentially transcendental agnosticism between the informational event (the synchronicity) having an actual (incoherent) relation to the subject and its having no relation to the subject is the key result insofar as it shows the coincidence world view to not have the necessity it would ike.
10) This we believe to be the rational establishment that there is no possibility of extirpating the interpretation of a synchronistic phenomenon as synchronistic (meaningful) as opposed to coincidence. Likewise it would be impossible to remove the non-belief in the phenomena (their reduction to non-meaningful events.
11)We must highlight the possibility that even the synchronistic event as meaningful is slightly misleading, for the possibility also exists that there is an actual relation between subject and event and yet it still the event is not meaningful (where meaningful means the event gives guidance in some way to the subject). This thesis is part of the thesis which says that the reality of the non-solid model does not entail things are not in a sense random. It only entails that a putative external informationally constructed world is in fact intimately tied to the subject.
12) The rational establishment of the inability to discern any of these possibilities over the other is important as it means all consciousness no matter how dogmatic about one version or the other is ultimately ungrounded. As such the possibility selected must be one taken, to an extent on belief.
13) We call the belief projection into the un-grounded, φantasy. Here it does not have a negative character but rather just is the nature of the application of belief to a model put forward (either hegemonically/subconsciously or actively/consciously).
14) ‘Reality’ as such has two senses. i) A term to attempt to refer to how things actually are (even if this is the fantasy (a different term) of knowing the unknowable) and ii) the φantasy commonly accepted in a culture as (i).