Φantasy: How do we expand this. We already said we did not wish to conceptually. But maybe this is erroneous. How can we map the loops that take place here. That is, when a concept becomes abstract and theoretical it suffers a certain death-by-theory, it is studied in vitro, and yet by the very nature of what is studied we might yet find there is sufficient power in this corpse to possess someone else. This theoretical daimon might easily leap out and get you. Note how this is phantastical language. You are wont to say that no demon or daimon will leap out and get me. But observe and remember that there is nothing in these scribbles but that interpretation which tells you they mean something. Stare at them and attempt to see them as meaning devoid lines, almost impossible. The concept as interpreted has a psychic life which will find a greater or lesser manifestation in your own thinking. This whole is the daimon, a truly ideal entity autopoetic in its ability to reproduce.
Φantasy is not so unrelated to its ordinary language use. But this is not a psychoanalytic use -though it might not be so far removed sometimes. What we wish to encompass in this notion though is the manner in which phantasy encapsulates the inability overcome some kind of factual account of being which lays beings out in such a manner to exclude the possibility of the phantastic.
Fantasy is fantasy understood as fantasy. Is there ever such a thing? Is this rarer than phantasy? There may be no sharp division here. If I daydream about being a superhero this is a fantasy. If I read a book about faeries and gain a great poetical longing for some notion of a hidden people in the forest and hills and subsequently even take up a pass time of looking for them, this is phantasy. Yet both seem like a flat contradiction of how the world is presented to me.
The latter operates within a peculiar epistemological realm which we must understand to do justice to forms of belief. Another part of the claim of the phantastic is that it makes no negative claim about the kind of phenomena. Phantastic does not mean subjective and merely internal desired imaginings, it means sometimes contingent on Being being a manner which we do not understand ordinarily.
Psychic accretions are a φantasy. This has already been mentioned. To tread the path of the psychic accretion is to have gone too far. We have wandered erred and indulged. Yet we must wander, we must err, we must indulge, for we have nothing else but this realm. All hope of grasping is lost here in this desolate land. When we do not allow ourselves to wander and to indulge and err what do we find? We find the ground from which the doctrine of accretions grew and that ground is empirical. How can we get round this? If we believe again in a rational world view then we have also drifted into φantasy. Surely that cannot be so. Yet it is, for the rational world view can do little to dent your monadic existence, it can bolster one interpretation of its manifestation and help its solidity solidify. Reified theory is φantasy, a psychic accretion no less, as pernicious as any Gorgon. It is not as it really is, any less than it discloses itself in stranger ways and these strange ways too are part of the disclosure. As they arise they cry out for interpretation which we may disregard yet we cannot disregard to the possibility to interpret them thus as the monadic loneliness cannot reach out beyond its φantasy. But isn’t this more than we intended φantasy to be?
Why did we move beyond the world? What made us wish to invoke other forces for explanation? And yet Plato precedes Aristotle. When we say we derived number from the world, do we say something cogent? Like P says, ‘here is one thing and here is another’. It comes from the gap which then says ‘but in order to have two things, I must have the concept of twoness’, hence there must be such an essence enabling my perception of these things as such. But the principium individuationis guarantees this without the Platonic need. From the nomads perseptive there are seemingly separate things. The creative conceptual power of being unfolds the twoness out of the physicality. But hold on, didn’t we just hide the Platonism in the the creative conceptual unfolding of being. We did indeed, we posited that there is a capacity of the mind’s to reformulate an understanding of existence. But then the Platonist can say that we just accessed the forms which were already there, they were the unfolding aspect perception. And the best retort we have is that the Platonism is then unneccessary. But is it any more unneccessary than the capacity of the mind to reformulate things on an empirical stream -which we can know must itself be intentionally mediated.
This bifurcation is a φantasy, more clearly so the Platonic side. It adds an element of epistemological possibility which can not be positively refuted. This failure to positively refute it, with the apparent manifestation of the essence of things (the ability to see something as such). The φantasy of Platonism is generative of the numerical psychic accretions which may be experienced in various ways.
Φantasy can be analysed into ontic and ontological manifestations. Those ontic φantasies relate to unknowables within the world, conspiracy theories, the truth of ‘normal’ news and the like fall into the category of ontic manifestations. The philosophies themselves: idealism, materialism, realism etc are ontological φantasies. Each one attempts to answer the question of being and leave the minimum of logical difficulty. Naturally they all fail but may each have advocates who presumably believe in the positions. Of course owing to the incoherence inherent in language there is no possibility to prove a given position wrong from a given φantasy, only the belief from within the φantasy.
Φantasy and Disclosure.
When we consider as foolish the self disclosure of the object we must be quite clear as to what kind of claim we are making against this thesis. If the thing did not self-disclose then it must have been disclosed by the monad itself. But when the monadic attention is caught by the thing, what happened there? What motivated the monad to disclose the thing if not the thing? We could postulate psychological/psychoanalytic factors that might determine this but then we would be lost in the φantasy of psychoanalytical thought and not have improved the matter. Furthermore it only creates a further recourse to a previous occasion on which the thing self-disclosed. That the thing disclosed itself is one more competing φantasy is the case yet it is one more competing φantasy.
The thing no doubt disclosed itself within the horizon of an event-complex which itself which is a context of existence. An event-complex disloses itself as unity containing things in some relation -a cat and a car e.g. The event-complex occurs and discloses itself in doing so. This implies there was a state in which an event-complex was not occuring. This is heuristically true of our experience: ‘it was just one thing after another.’
The aspect flip involved to perceive the psychic accretions as part of an ontology involves the phantasy of an aether. The phantasy of aether as ontologicall effective/interactive -in another sense the interaction between the substantial and the informational helps to give rise to the aspect flip but is only a sufficient condition of such an ontology.
The aether in this sense is information. But information is an ontological differential. Awareness entails information and must be interpreted as altering that which is out there..