I believe the key to showing the confusion in some of the speculative philosophy lies in untangling the manifestations. The key manifestation here is that of some kind of existence without an interpreter/observer. This manifestation arises quite naturally all the time, it is related to what Husserl called the ‘natural attitude’. We inhabit the world and from its seemless spatio-temporal flow we easily think of things continuing beyond the incoherent border of perception in the same wise. This is a manifestation, it is the one that gives rise to the view from nowhere, to objectivity. This manifestation is incoherent, but this is to say little because so are all the manifestations. The key opposing manifestation is that the contents of the perceptual field are somehow created by the being doing the perceiving. This is the Kantian formulation which pushes this constitutive power all the way into spatio-temporality itself. The linguistic turn adds to this manifestation or rather curtails it, limiting the spatio-temporal metaphysical claim to that of a grammatical one. Space and time can only mean the instance in which these words are used. We agree with this up the point of departure of the accretive nature of the pneuma, which creates an pneuminous overlay to the putative externality.
The primordial being of a thing then is its use. It is the interchangeable status of things as use items. Primordial hammers are stones. That things persist beyond perception does not turn on their thingness but on their manifestation of continuing existence as a thing (a spatio-temporal thing). In the manifestation of a pure idealism this is potentially not possible as there is no-thing out side of the idealism. In a more limited idealism, there is the possibility that things outside of the ideality may be identical to within it but this cannot be known with certainty (something akin to what happens in the pneuminous disclosure). Here though language is important because it is the home of the pneuminous. When we say somthing ‘is’ this is an accretion, the accretion of being (a complicated accretion to say the least). Nevertheless it should be recognised as Heidegger did that the actual saying of being brings being about. This means that being is not the term for a putative externality outside of a hermeneutic structure. The name for this is nothing. The continual simple use of the world takes the things to be there continually, but the theoretical disclosure of the world epistemologically cuts short the ability to speak of the things as being in this way. The manifestation of a spatio-temporality allows a specultive analysis to take place but only so long as certain correlational traits are maintained. The first of these is the spatio-temporality which potentially is different outside of awareness (phenomenologically e.g. the synchronistic fluid world view) and the second of these is the individuality of each thing which may have no determinate existence is relations outside of awareness. This point turns on whether the identity of intentionality (of a being we call aware i.e. ourseleves) with the relation that we would call physical of one ‘inanimate’ thing to another, holds. This begs the question in Harman’s scheme as to whether we are a real object or not. He says I am a real object, but what does this ‘I’ entail. If it is my body then there seems to be a problem, as my weight upon my chair is not my intentional relation to it. But if it’s not then what is it? My body as object’s relation to the chair, exclusive of some other me? If I am not my body what am I? The answer seems simple enough, I am the uses of the word I and nothing more and simultaneously the secondary I accretion that occurs after this primary one but is yet there to beguile us. The third of these is the belief that the naming/accretive relation is nothing. If the naming accretive process has gathered, discreted, shored up the use thing in anyway then the persistence outside of awareness is unwarranted as similar. The intentionality problem then returns for now for the identity of relations to persist, the putatively separate thing must consider other things as wholes, as accretions. This is more of a challenge than equating intentionality without a magickal effect with physical relations and frankly the word speculative rises to the fore here.
It seems to make more sense to say that if there is an identity between human/thing relations and thing/thing relations then this is at the primordial level of what something more akin to the ready to hand in which the thing has not shown itself as theoretical object/accretion. This means something akin to the fact that being as we know it is more like the theoretical abstraction and readiness-to-hand/use is a kind of pre-cognitive level. The phantasy of returning to this is what the buddhists seek (in part). But as the kind of being we are and become more and more or, whilst we should recognise the existence of this aspect we mustn’t lose track of the importance of the linguistic turn as complementary to any speculative philosophy.