This is it: When you perceive a being such that it is alive it becomes alive. This sounds errant nonsense but it is at the heart of what I want to propose. Life is not defineable with recourse to some scientific criteria but rather only by apophansis. Accreting happens greater when things are loved, there is an pneuminous investment made in the accretion. If I see a bee and find it marvellous, a living wonder, I might yet alsol perceive a very sophisticated drone that amazes me. I might be able to separate the mechanical perception from the living but after a while this drone might be more impressive than the bee e.g. insofar as it comes when I call it. I might then begin to develop a fondness for this drone, I might name it and so on. This has formed an accretion with a kind of mirroring consciousness as part of its disclosure (the drone has a kind of consciousness but now I attribute it with more). This kind of happening occurs in all manner of occasions: a cuddly toy, a car etc. This magickal perception of aliveness might be nothing more than the transference of feeling onto cold inert matter. But it might be something else. We are faced with another agnostic dysjunction. True it is not so strong a one as there is less experience and more feeling that such beings have a ‘life’ to them. Yet the synchronicitous argument returns to haunt this occasion. If the pneuma can interfere, generate related symbols to itself in being (interact with the umbra) then it can do it in the case of such perceived-as-alive-things. This dialectic of course also applies to ourselves.
Further to the attempt to untangle some of the various terminological threads comes the insight that from an accepted manifestation other manifestations appear as phantasies. So if I buy into a materialist manifestation then the solid world appears a phantasy and vice versa. Phantasy we will recall is an epistemologically ineradicable option repressed only by greater weight being given to the accepted manifestation.
Let us remember the notion of the agnostic disjunction as a helpful terminological description. The agnostic disjunction occurs exactly in a situation where the outcome is not decided definitely by any kind of certainty but rather only a preference for one option over another. The pertinent example in this work has always been the interpretation of synchronicity as either a solid world statistical possibility or a fluid world pneuminous interference. The impossibility of arbitrating this (and other similar disjunctions) is named the agnostic disjunction.
There is no perfectly clear boundary between a fantasy and a phantasy, but the general idea is that a fantasy is an engagement with something for which I have no grounds for believing might happen (I might become superman), whereas a phantasy is a possible way in which existence might actually be interpreted. It is incumbent on phantasies that they are able to demonstrate criteria for their acceptance to enable them to be competing manifestations. I did not previously spot the overlap of manifestation and phantasy but clearly the terms are related. To reiterate: when a manifestation is not accepted it is a phantasy in relation to the dominant manifestation. For example, a committed idealist has materialism as a phantasy and they spend their time trying to shore up the territory against materialist incursions.
Here we can see the relation to the philosophy of agency, but this philosophy is largely functional only under the pneuminous manifestation. In the pneuminous manifestation various accretions are vying for territory. Pneuminous beings largely taken over by certain accretions (idealist ones in the example) cannot actually defeat the materialist because both positions are incoherent (remember that one).
It sounds confusing and what confuses me sometimes is that we must remember that pneuminosity is a complete theory. That is, if from the agnostic disjunction you opt for pneuminous theory, yes you are still open to the phantasy of a solid world, but then you must also account for the solid world theory from within the theory.
There does need to be a better description of the dialectic of subject formation but its going to be something like this: Selves are accretions, they are constituted by other pneuminous beings. Pneuminous beings invariably have a self accretion of some kind (though it is not necessary that this is the case, think of certain kinds of what we call mental illness). The self accretion is course accreted to all manner of different pneuminous structures. Now accepting that a materialist would blatantly reject this explanation of things, the pneuminous description of such a theoretical adherent is that they are accreted to a solid manifestation of existence and supporting accretions. A reasonable question would be as to whether it is better to call the self accretion a kind of discrete name/body pneuminous form or whether the self accretion is incoherent unity of the name/body and its accompanying accretions (which would manifest as beliefs etc)? The latter sounds very reasonable in one sense as we might say, here is John, he is a materialist. The very predication instantiates that he is a materialist. But maybe we would also say here is John, he has materialist views, in which case the former looks more appropriate. Potentially there are different kinds of self accretion anyway, some of which are deeply intertwined with political/religious/or otherwise views, and other kinds of self accretion where the pneuminous threads relation to its beliefs is weaker. This kind of multiplicity is possibly the best way to go with it.
It seems incredibly hard to untangle pneuminous theory and manifestationism. Not that they need necessarily untangling as such but there does seem to be a problem that probably is concerned with the manifestations as they appear if one accepts pneuminosity and if one does not.
Let’s start by noting that pneuminosity is a manifestation, it’s the world showing itself as an informational substance (pneuma). This manifestation is shown by pneuminous interference phenomena. As soon as you have pneuminosity you also have the idea of its beyond, which paradoxically is immediately pneuminously rendered but is a special case. This is the umbra. The umbratic is necessarily never directly perceived but exists only as the idea that there must be something behind the pneuma: an ineffable remainder outside of consciousness.
In fact this does not say that the umbratic necessarily exists, it is a manifestation from within pneuminous theory. Pneuminous theory could maintain that there is nothing but pneuma, this is a competing manifestation of the theory. However as pneuminosity is also compatible with the notion of umbra, indeed would find it hard to eradicate it, thus the umbratic is not to be removed. If we tried to say that there was only pneuma we would be in the position of denying that the pneuma might be overlaying something else. If we do deny this we are left with how the pneuma supports itself as only information. That the pneuminous is not just passive in relation to the umbra is accepted, but that it is self supporting insofar as the bifurcation seems to be begged by the Kantian manifestation of being for us, which is not removable.
What the speculative realist tries to show is that absolute being as can be accessed outside of human conception. This conception as a manifestation can certainly appear and seem cogent true, but what it fails to note is that what is equally cogent is the Kantian being-for-us manifestation. The argument between these two cannot be settle as without some kind of superior science it is not possible to get past that epistemology. The we-can-know-being-in-itself manifestation can champ at the bit and point to all manner of physics and cosmological enormity but it still cannot bypass the possibility that all of this might be just how the universe appears to a being like ourselves and that even our most non-human seeming scientific measurements are just necessarily an extension of what is epistemically possible to us.
And that’s how it gets tangled because now I’m talking about epistemological problems that occur with or without pneuminosity being in the picture. For sure pneuminosity is a form a correlationism but it is a particular kind of correlationist picture. Pneuminosity entails that pneuma and umbra interact. In older language (the fit is not perfect) that secondary qualities affect the primary qualities.
To return to the notion that the pneuma is self supporting we note the following dialectic occurs. Pneuma as information, contains the idea of its own beyond umbra, this idea necessarily exists as an accretion. Thus the accretion of the in umbratic exists which as the pneuma is not passive means it is possible that the umbra is created after the pneuma as its perceived ineffable holder.
Manifestationism is just about pointing out that somehow different ways in which being shows itself compete with each other. We cannot even say about how we choose one as subjectivising the philosophy would already have selected a certain manifestation. The space must be left open.
There is being is still not unreasonable. Its disclosure is its manifestation. It all sounds quite Heidegger when it is phrased this way. It can be argued that the statement ‘there is being’ has gone too far of course. This argument turns on whether being can be said to connote. In pneuminosity of course being has indeed accreted to Heidegger. But if being were just to be said to mean that some kind of existence obtains it would seem relatively uncontroversial, maybe.
Let us reconsider the matter in the endless process of reflection that is philosophy. Let us also introduce the term pneuminous interference to accrete around what was previously termed ‘synchronicity’. Pneuminous interference means the ability of the pneuma to interfere at the ordinary reality level to create the paranormal effect (like the omen/sign/message from existence). Let us also introduce the term ‘agnostic disjunction’ to mean those disjunctions that are generated with no reconciliation. The relevant one in this work has always been that the experience of putative pneuminous interference is either reconcilable as statistically possible (solid world) or forces the monad to accept an incoherent fluidity to being. The very nature of experience entails that one cannot overpower the other.
This phenomenon then has set up two primordial manifestations: solid world and fluid world. The notion of manifestations is very important. It sets the possibility of a metaphilosophy of disjunctive manifestations competing with each other pneuminously for accretive dominance. This accretive dominance can only be seen as the behaviour of the pneuma (it accretes) and not an active teleology. An active teleology would have to be dialectically fed back into the system. That is the accretion of teleology would be reapplied back to the pneuma itself as a further possible manifestation.
Pneuminous theory and manifestationism seem to be deeply tied together. Manifestationism just says there are many ways in which being shows itself. Not all of these entail pneuminosity. However from within pneuminosity manifestationism also applies. There is for instance the idea of an outside to the pneuminous, an inconceivable shadow part, incoherent yet endlessly remanifesting as a notion: the umbra.
It is from within pneuminosity that the manifestations become accretions competing for the territory (the picture described above). A decent question would be: how does the picture differ if you remove pneuminosity? Only on one side of the disjunction does pneuminosity apply, yet on the other there is still information. Arguably there is still something like pneuminosity, just in this instance it is limited to local subjects in a solid spatio-temporal existence and there is no pneuminous interference.
Part of the claim is I suppose that the disjunction is maybe not a decision but more of an experience. There may be an allegiance to the solid world but the alternative possibility is always there manifest to be repressed or not.
What is key is the first person experience as epistemologically generating some of these manifestations. Someone like Whitehead wants to remove the first person epistemological problems by making every event a point of view. This is fine but it ignores the manifestation problem and replaces it with speculative metaphysics. What must be acknowledged is that no mass scientific picture presupposing an continuous existence outside of first person perspective can adequately remove the epistemological baggage that comes with it, no matter how outrageous and ridiculous it might seem.
Unless mass science produces an outlook/philosophy that is not hostile to these manifestations, it will not be accepted because people can and do experience phenomena that make them doubt the continuous framework as exhaustive. As is endlessly stated (herein) the reality of these phenomena outside subjective psychology is entirely irrelevant as that just entails a recourse to the position that was initially disagreed with to dismiss the phenomenon in question.
To reiterate again, this is either ontologically important (because it turns reality is something more akin to the fluid world) and hence sociologically important, or it is sociologically important because pneuminous interference manifestations will continue to appear and give meaning to people.