Manifestationism 1.1

It seems incredibly hard to untangle pneuminous theory and manifestationism. Not that they need necessarily untangling as such but there does seem to be a problem that probably is concerned with the manifestations as they appear if one accepts pneuminosity and if one does not.

Let’s start by noting that pneuminosity is a manifestation, it’s the world showing itself as an informational substance (pneuma). This manifestation is shown by pneuminous interference phenomena. As soon as you have pneuminosity you also have the idea of its beyond, which paradoxically is immediately pneuminously rendered but is a special case. This is the umbra. The umbratic is necessarily never directly perceived but exists only as the idea that there must be something behind the pneuma: an ineffable remainder outside of consciousness.

In fact this does not say that the umbratic necessarily exists, it is a manifestation from within pneuminous theory. Pneuminous theory could  maintain that there is nothing but pneuma, this is a competing manifestation of the theory. However as pneuminosity is also compatible with the notion of umbra, indeed would find it hard to eradicate it, thus the umbratic is not to be removed. If we tried to say that there was only pneuma we would be in the position of denying that the pneuma might be overlaying something else.  If we do deny this we are left with how the pneuma supports itself as only information. That the pneuminous is not just passive in relation to the umbra is accepted, but that it is self supporting insofar as the bifurcation seems to be begged by the Kantian manifestation of being for us, which is not removable.

What the speculative realist tries to show is that absolute being as can be accessed outside of human conception.  This conception as a manifestation can certainly appear and seem cogent true, but what it fails to note is that what is equally cogent is the Kantian being-for-us manifestation. The argument between these two cannot be settle as without some kind of superior science it  is not possible to get past that epistemology. The we-can-know-being-in-itself manifestation can champ at the bit and point to all manner of physics and cosmological enormity but it still cannot bypass the possibility that all of this might be just how the universe appears to a being like ourselves and that even our most non-human seeming scientific measurements are just necessarily an extension of what is epistemically possible to us.

And that’s how it gets tangled because now I’m talking about epistemological problems that occur with or without pneuminosity being in the picture. For sure pneuminosity is a form a correlationism but it is a particular kind of correlationist picture. Pneuminosity entails that pneuma and umbra interact. In older language (the fit is not perfect) that secondary qualities affect the primary qualities.

To return to the notion that the pneuma is self supporting we note the following dialectic occurs. Pneuma as information, contains the idea of its own beyond umbra, this idea necessarily exists as an accretion. Thus the accretion of the in umbratic exists which as the pneuma is not passive means it is possible that the umbra is created after the pneuma as its perceived ineffable holder.

Manifestationism is just about pointing out that somehow different ways in which being shows itself compete with each other. We cannot even say about how we choose one as subjectivising the philosophy would already have selected a certain manifestation. The space must be left open.

There is being is still not unreasonable. Its disclosure is its manifestation. It all sounds quite Heidegger when it is phrased this way. It can be argued that the statement ‘there is being’ has gone too far of course. This argument turns on whether being can be said to connote. In  pneuminosity of course being has indeed accreted to Heidegger. But if being were just to be said to mean that some kind of existence obtains it would seem relatively uncontroversial, maybe.

 

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