Causation we might say, following Wittgenstein, would be purely those occasions in which we saw fit to apply the word ’cause’. The word might also lose its natural home. A perceived cause is not an actual cause (two things might have no relation insofar as anything in existence can be unrelated to another thing within it): ‘I caused that to happen by the power of my mind’ might be true, but in the event of that being a applied to a door opening seemingly by the wind, we have no reason to believe this to be the case.
So if someone were to say this to us, what should we believe? That they were joking? That they were mad? That they were gullibly indulging some form of erroneous belief about the power of the mind? Any of these seem a possibility to us. But what if someone fixed us with a glare that cowed our person and told us this in such a manner this had occurred for this reason? Would all of us still be able to hold fixedly to these beliefs? Possibly the accusation of insanity would rise to the fore. But then what would madness mean here? Is it the madness of delusion that frightens us or is this merely a diversion from the madness of power which the person projects? The two surely are inseparable and the fear of power will contaminate a staunch belief that might allow the secondary fear that –resonates with the fear of power- they did indeed cause the door to shut by the power of their mind.
Does it help the case that we heard and felt the wind? Does it rid us of this epistemological quandary? ‘It was just the wind you madman!’ we might say if we were brave. More likely we do think they are mad and we are frightened of the power of madness, the wind is a salve to prove they lack this power. But we must also allow that when they say ‘you are mistaken, the wind answers my call’ at which moment the wind blows again with a terrible severity. What then are we to say? We must invoke a coincidence to defend ourselves from the terror of this possibility. The figure might have estimate the cycle of the wind and chosen his moment, he might have trusted to providence that a gust would occur as he said it, maybe the wind blew strongly the whole time and his mention of it again merely drew ourselves towards it.
There is if we allow it a lurking disclosure of the possibility of truth behind the claims of the figure, if not truth, the appearance of truth under the auspice of power.