Pneuminous Connection to Solidity

If we accept the manifestation of pure pneuma then we find the following is also true. This self same manifestation also contains within it the manifestation of being as solid and continuing outside of awareness. As an idea it is hence an hence an accretion of pneuma. This paradoxical accretion we have called the umbratic.

If what we perceive as reality shows itself in a way such that the pneuma can interact with the umbra then it raises the possibility that the umbratic as an accretion formed within the pneuma is actually becoming a reality that can exist outside of consciousness when it previously was not.

This would be a kind of inversion of being becoming conscious of itself. It implies the notion that possibly being was aware in itself,  but ironically through the generation of beings within itself that possess a self awareness -pieces unable to process their essential connection to the whole- these beings, as emissaries of Being conceive being through epistemological restraint and in this process create a notion of externality as solid and disconnected from awareness. This very conceptualisation dialectically feeds back into Being creating exactly this kind of independent solidity. Rather than existence slowly gaining in awareness, it is actually losing it through the conceptual action of its own agents.

 

This is an interesting idea, a consequence of certain disjunctions. Of course it has no necessity, it is an extreme possibility. Yet it remains possible if the solidity and the information interact. More interestingly we might ask: if it isn’t true then why not? For it not to be true, either the information doesn’t interact with the externality or there are limits/conditions under which this is the case. The latter seems more likely. This means the question is: what are the restraints on the information such that it maintains the appearance of a cogent solid externality?

Further questions regarding the actual conceptualisation of pneuma also arise. If Being is pneuma, how does being that is not a pneuminous being relate amongst itself within the idea of the externality? You can say that this doesn’t matter, because a la Husserl everything is contained within consciousness a priori. But the pneuma also contains the idea of the solid externality (the continuous world), as such it contains the incoherent idea of beings not ordinarily perceived as conscious interacting with each other outside of field of awareness as we would ordinarily conceive of one. The paradoxical idea arises within pneuma that there are umbratic places in which there is no pneuma, and now we are a stones throw from a more regular scientific conception. If we say there is pneuminous relations going on at all levels we grant some kind of panpsychism and seem to admit that the umbratic exists external to awareness all be it attenuated slightly by a kind of Whiteheadian pneuminous pole.

The problem clearly needs more thought but what is said here confirms a basic sense that the notion of pneuma creates an umbratic so strongly that its manifestation is that it could be independent of it. Ontological speculation is not the aim here and hence the Whiteheadian route is barred.

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Phantasy-Manifestation-Agnostic Disjunction

Further to the attempt to untangle some of the various terminological threads comes the insight that from an accepted manifestation other manifestations appear as phantasies. So if I buy into a materialist manifestation then the solid world appears a phantasy and vice versa. Phantasy we will recall is an epistemologically ineradicable option repressed only by greater weight being given to the accepted manifestation.

Let us remember the notion of the agnostic disjunction as a helpful terminological description. The agnostic disjunction occurs exactly in a situation where the outcome is not decided definitely by any kind of certainty but rather only a preference for one option over another. The pertinent example in this work has always been the interpretation of synchronicity as either a solid world statistical possibility or a fluid world pneuminous interference. The impossibility of arbitrating this (and other similar disjunctions) is named the agnostic disjunction.

There is no perfectly clear boundary between a fantasy and a phantasy, but the general idea is that a fantasy is an engagement with something for which I have no grounds for believing might happen (I might become superman), whereas a phantasy is a possible way in which existence might actually be interpreted. It is incumbent on phantasies that they are able to demonstrate criteria for their acceptance to enable them to be competing manifestations. I did not previously spot the overlap of manifestation and phantasy but clearly the terms are related. To reiterate: when a manifestation is not accepted it is a phantasy in relation to the dominant manifestation. For example, a committed idealist has materialism as a phantasy and they spend their time trying to shore up the territory against materialist incursions.

Here we can see the relation to the philosophy of agency, but this philosophy is largely functional only under the pneuminous manifestation. In the pneuminous manifestation various accretions are vying for territory. Pneuminous beings largely taken over by certain accretions (idealist ones in the example) cannot actually defeat the materialist because both positions are incoherent (remember that one).

It sounds confusing and what confuses me sometimes is that we must remember that pneuminosity is a complete theory. That is, if from the agnostic disjunction you opt for pneuminous theory, yes you are still open to the phantasy of a solid world, but then you must also account for the solid world theory from within the theory.

There does need to be a better description of the dialectic of subject formation but its going to be something like this: Selves are accretions, they are constituted by other pneuminous beings. Pneuminous beings invariably have a self accretion of some kind (though it is not necessary that this is the case, think of certain kinds of what we call mental illness). The self accretion is course accreted to all manner of different pneuminous structures. Now accepting that a materialist would blatantly reject this explanation of things, the pneuminous description of such a theoretical adherent is that they are accreted to a solid manifestation of existence and supporting accretions. A reasonable question would be as to whether it is better to call the self accretion a kind of discrete name/body pneuminous form or whether the self accretion is incoherent unity of the name/body and its accompanying accretions (which would manifest as beliefs etc)? The latter sounds very reasonable in one sense as we might say, here is John, he is a materialist. The very predication instantiates that he is a materialist. But maybe we would also say here is John, he has materialist views, in which case the former looks more appropriate. Potentially there are different kinds of self accretion anyway,  some of which are deeply intertwined with political/religious/or otherwise views, and other kinds of self accretion where the pneuminous threads relation to its beliefs is weaker. This kind of multiplicity is possibly the best way to go with it.

 

 

Sketch of Accretion/Concept and Analysis Regarding Speculative Implications.

I was looking at the sand/grit container at the train station and contemplating how my framework accounts for this. It’s so tempting to make the notion that only the front is presented. This is true but also not true. Pneuminously the container is given to me immediately, I see directly not the yellow plastic box but the container as grit container. But this thing is information or pneuma, I see an accretion of pneuma forming a whole new structure.  As a passing thought I see this raises the question as to whether or not there are ‘pneuminous atoms’. As a manifestation this seems cogent. The fact that yellow has various connotations to any given individual does not mean it does not also have the abstractive possibility as an atom, an informational feature further irreducible. Yellow is an accretion because it is indelibly accreted to so many other phenomena yet it also has an atomic manifestation as something pure, we might say that accretions of abstraction and purity are able to connect to certain phenomena that present themselves as atomic in this sense.

But we have strayed from the point. The accretion rather like in phenomenology has already contained the idea that it exists in space and time and the ‘what it is’. Its constitution as spatio -temporal is a priori but not its use. But here it gets confusing for these are in some sense separate accretions held together by a conditional relation. That it is a grit container entails that it is an object in space/time but that it is a spatio-temporal object clearly doesn’t entail it is a grit container. There is a lurking manifestation in here, one that separates out the solidity from the information. In one sense the information (the grit containerness) is only made possible by the spatio/temporality. In another we must feel that this is a contingency and in some sense separate, for I might not know it was a grit container. It might not have grit in it, and if no one ever knew that and thought it was a bin, then it would be a bin and that would be it. So in that sense you can’t talk about autonomous objects because the thing is the information, or rather the information is the relation to us. This is what brings in the pneuminous accretions as metaphysics for this problem. It can only continue to be a grit container outside of its functionality as one (its inceptive intention) if it is imbued with this accretion in a way external to human influence, or rather that once the human accretion has imbued this thing with this information, this information persists attached to what I have elsewhere called the umbra. Even if spatio temporality persists outside of human perception, without a pneuminous trace in the thing it is no longer a grit container, desolate and alone on the platform it is in a sense not.  Here Heidegger is cogent to me: the naming is the relation of being, but if we extend the accretive trace then the naming has persisted outside of our sheltering and now holds this thing, even on the desolate platform, as the faithful grit container, standing in reserve to protect us on the icy days and other beings might have relations to the grit container but they must fight this pneuminous hold if they wish to claim it as their own).

Let us review this fruitful exercise. We want the solid thing and information to be as one naively. But if this is just a name for us then no designation persists and Wittgenstein’s meaning as use is exhaustive of the situation. So then the thing that persists (outside of our use) cannot truly be called what we have called it because that is not the relation that the other things have engaged it in. The speculative realist might say I am splitting hairs here but I don’t think so. If you don’t know that the naming-human relation does not add some kind of difference to the umbratic-thing then you shouldn’t call it that in its relation to other things. Maybe there are natural kinds instances where the usage seems appropriate, where the accretive idea is more harmonious from human and other relations, but this is still problematic because any accretion like ‘fire’ is going to have many accretive connections in the pneuma. It is from this instance possible that we could be presented with video of a phenomenon that we could not recognise informationally as ‘fire’ (in some strange intergalactic form) and then the fire accretion would not be touching it. In this sense this phenomena would not be ‘fire’, neither as use, nor as thing out of our scope of understanding. But it is interesting here and we should not shy away from it. For when the scientist somehow understands that this phenomenon is some raging cosmological fire we accretively appropriate it thusly and we are then presented with the manifestation that it was somehow ‘fire’ all along.

Maybe the difference lies in that part of the accretion itself (in fire) is that such things once recognised [as such] have always been thus, whereas in the case of the grit container, the umbra admits of contingent relations even to its creators. This is clearly not all the story here and I note that my attempt to summarise and review has just opened the can wider…

The Ontological Argument and Accretive Theory

Amongst the catalogue of observations in this realm is the notion that the ontological argument has something of the accretive flavour to it. If we say that because ‘I have the idea of a god therefore there must be a god’ (a simplified version of notion), we can readily see how it contains very little weight, or at least to the modern mind is unconvincing. Having the idea of something hardly entails its actuality. Saying that ‘because the idea is greater than me so I cannot have conceived of it’ does little more because I can readily conceive of many things ‘greater’ than me -whatever that might mean.

Yet from the accretive perspective it has a different meaning. Here, because I have the idea of a perfect God does entail that there is one, for they are being accreted in the very act of contemplation. The incoherence of the notion of God is problematic but as all concepts exhibit incoherence it is only a difference of degree and not of kind. Monotheistic Gods by there noetic nature have a different flavour to polytheistic Gods. Your Monotheistic God is all powerful. Is it transcendent or immanent? Really it’s both, the monstrous montheistic God accretion is necessarily transcendent and immanent, it can act like an interfering external power, or it can be all and everything. The notion is so incoherent no one can hope to figure it out in the first place but equally it necessarily is infinitely more powerful than us so it is hardly surprising it can behave in this way.

We have to side step the issue of the accretive formation of selves to talk about this because they need to be assumed to make any headway. In some sense of course the God accretion is the self accretion mirrored back into the sublime enormousness of everything (a Sartrean resonance strikes here). The God idea only exists by virtue of the self accretion, like an instantaneous artificial intelligence superior to ourselves, except unlike the overtaking of human cognitive power which may take decades, this happens instantaneously and purely by incoherent definition.

Let us apply our caveat to be clear. Down one corridor is a being with thoughts certainly reliant on the intertwining but still with them contained in the brain circuitry. Down this corridor, the informational is substantial (pneuminous). Here you can see the pneuma, look it’s there in front of you now, overlaying all that umbratic stuff, accreting to it, information itself. When you play in you mind you play with pneuma, everything you conceive exists pneuminously and as such not within your accretion (though necessarily attached to it). The monotheistic God accretion is the botched up accretion of infinity, power, sometimes goodness, sometimes capriciousness, perfection. All of these abstract terms are incoherent in themselves yet formed out of some curious dialectical dance with experience from an abstract potential, then reapplied to transcendent-immanence. Down here, the God is real and one of the most effective forms of Magickal disclosure possible; its actions supply the perfect hermeneutic for its own omnipotence supplying a feedback to support its parasitic accretive life. Thankfully this God, though an accretion of gargantuan age and size is as schizopneuminous as it is powerful. Fragmented, paradoxical, dispersed and contained the threads that accrete it, rend it similarly assunder.

Ironically this God manifested its accretion only through the self accretions as a pseudo-necessary sticking together of pneuma, which, once stuck together can scarcely be pulled apart -so hoary is its agglomerative power. After this fact this ironic God can indeed be found as an event within the pneuma that could be discovered in a manner very similar to the ontological argument and in this instance it would in a certain wise be true. Hence its accretion-creation renders it now as that potent monster, exceeding the human consciousness by an infinity and yet it is for all its seeming necessity: contingent.

 

Disclaimer:

Apart from the problem of self accretions there is yet another manifestation lurking in here. That however will have to wait for another day.

Accretive Objects

“Found objects are always significant because of their subjective investment. This applies not only to the baby’s transitional object, but to any object that in later life arrests our attention through its having this
special aura? Pebbles, pieces of driftwood, images provided by the natural  world, even people can be thought of in this way. All are ‘found objects’, in which we simultaneously ‘find’ parts of ourselves. Artists are particularly likely to collect ‘found objects’ that resonate with personal or ‘aesthetic’ significance, and the wider notion of finding oneself in, and through, an ohjective medium is central to understanding the artistic enterprise from this Winicottian perspective.” Kenneth Wright -Mirroring and Attunement, Chapter 9.

I was struck in this passage of Wright’s book by the similarity of this to the pneuminous kind of notion I want to push. Of course it is different but the text gives [me] one of those moments where you see how close it is some forms of psychoanalysis. But really this should come as no surprise, psychoanalysis always treads close to phenomenology whether it wants to or not (Jung understood this). What probably is of interest to me here is not the inferential importance of the ‘mother accretion’ -though I could scarcely deny this- but rather the manifestation of things as having special aura’s, being attractive to us as being part of ourselves.

Now I am going to maintain (under a certain manifestation) that all things are formed by pneuma, so the knife I use in the canteen and resist pocketing (hence sending it back for re-use) is no less a pneuminous thing than the special rock I find in the field. It is purely the mode of appearing that makes them different. When a theory tells us why something discloses itself as special it moves beyond a phenomenology (psychoanalysis of course does cross this line). Attempting to walk in this kind of bracketed magickal landscape gives us only the disclosure of the thing ‘as special’ and not the why. But this phenomenology also gives us everything as informational accretion, including the incoherent ‘self’. The ‘special’ object and the incoherent ‘self’ as such, in the moment of disclosure are connected. In psychoanalysis this may be tacitly reduced to a purely mental level with the acceptance of no physical interaction, yet down the other corridor is precisely the manifestation of the connection which would include the manifestation of interaction between this putative dualism.

In this realm the connection is real and a priori. Furthermore in our imagined encounter, once the thing has disclosed itself in this manner there is here the opportunity to accrete the thing further. For after we have our ‘special object’ we may then take it with us in life and thus it will accrete further to the self accretion. This may be a pernicious and/or rewarding relationship in which because the pneuma can interact with the umbra there is always there threat that loss of the object can be painful/damaging to the self/body-umbra. This though merely heightens the same effect (in a magickal kind of context) as happens through connections to the fetishised house and its adornments, the extension of a self/family accretion.

The ethical implication is there on the one hand in terms of non-attachment, at the same time it is completely lacking because whilst we might disperse our accretions through such other accretions ultimately there is nothing to say whether this is any better than keeping the self accretion more contained.

Laying out.

This is such a jumble of material and yet I frequently have insights of how it all knits together and then completely lose the unity again. So we’re looking at a phenomenological philosophy that tries to say problems arise between different systems that mean the arguments between them cannot be reconciled because of the incoherence inherent in all concepts. Furthermore the incoherent concepts are manifestations of how we take things to be. In the case of philosophy idealism and realism are both irreconcilable manifestations, but both incoherent by themselves. So we do have some kind of a meta Kantian limitation on the whole system yet at the same time acknowledge that the manifestation of Kant’s incorrectness is also very powerful.

Umbratic is the shadow thing outside of our perception, taken to be the same as within perception but ultimately unknown to hold this identity indeed one phenomenological aspect can tell us a priori it is not identical as it is perceived and this is necessarily some kind of difference. Clearly the problem is incoherent but this is not a reason for dismissing it. A realism would tell us there is no different but the same epistemological doubt means we cannot be sure of this. So the umbratic is close to the thing in itself, but maybe not identical but certainly a related manifestation. The umbratic is the brute stuff of primary qualities.

Cthonic is being perceived but uncategorized. When we have no obvious concept for what is before us the cthonic is rumbling. Is the cthonic the incoherence? Maybe.

The pneumatic is the information, the sense of incoherent coherence that pervades the world in its demarcation. This is a computer. Do I know what I computer is? what is everything I could call a computer? No I don’t, this is incoherence. But it is completely coherent to me that this is a computer nevertheless.

And the magick bit? Well that’s about pointing out that the pneuma may be capable of affecting the umbra. It’s about saying that pneuma without umbra may be capable of action in the world i.e. a spirit or a spell. This philosophy doesn’t say that this is true, it says that you can never know if it’s true or not and that some events act as criteria for our thinking that it is true.

Ethical possibilities here include reconsidering how we can just thinking anything about anyone and it doesn’t really matter because we are discrete creatures in spatio temporal holder. It means grannies special pen really is grannies special pen. It means that things that we lose that hurt, hurt because we lose the pneumatic thing which was literally part of us.

We consider currently whether there is a supplementary manifestation of energia required. Apophansis seems sufficient to bypass this in one sense i.e. if I see a stone as possessed by a spirit so it is so. But the manifestation of a force is still undeniably one. Vitalism is also a manifestation…

 

lncoherence 8.7

Much has been made of my incoherence notion -by me obviously. The question that discloses itself in clarity now is: is the incoherence that I express exists in a conceptual formation pre analysis on Derridean/Wittgensteinian horizons (incoherent coherence) the same as the incoherence found in the synchronistic phenomenon? This has certainly been my claim, that is that the sense of incoherent belief that this phenomena has a sense to it yet if you ask me how this sense happens I am unable to give it to you, that this sense is the same as the problem I have when I try to account for the wholeness of the sense of a words functioning. If this identity does not hold then I have simply reified incoherence and then linked two things. I can indeed would argue that this is find because the accretion of incoherence a priori links the two but this is unconvincing unless you accept the accretions themselves whose ontology is somewhat incoherent…