Accretion/Object Problem

Is this hammer real? Yes it is a real accretion. Is the accretion made of other things? Yes and no. The hammer as pneuminous hammer accretion is exactly that. The grammatical form of ‘is the hammer made of different parts?’ makes sense so yes the hammer is made of parts. It is not necessary for me to know about the parts to perceive the hammer. I might have a one piece metal hammer, then we might not notice any composite nature. The hammer hammers, this its meaning, not what it is made of. The accretion occurs in the conjunction of the use and shape and the materials that might make it . These are all pneuminously connected. The idea that a hammer is grammatically what we call physical and not conceptual is part of it, as such it must be materially constructed, it is not not a real hammer if it is made of plastic, only if the plastic is not strong enough, then we might say it is a rubbish hammer.

The thing, a hammer that has been used might persist even as a hammer outside of our perception. If Wittgenstein were purely correct this would not be the case, after the use has past there is no trace. What was plate but is now an ashtray is just an ashtray. Pneuminously the plate trace remains accreted to the umbratic.

Its so close to OOO, the umbratic is like the molten core that harman talks about, except again, I’m not even sure existence external to our kind of perception registers the hammer as having any separate border of discretion, we do that. OOO anthropomorphises objects. A truly alien reality perspective need not even have this extended aesthetic causality.

Yes pneuminosity does retain the middle object problem, except I’m not sure it is a problem. Pneuminosity is a phenomenology, a description of a certain necessity if paranormality obtains. Under this circumstance either everything is pure information all the way down, which is fine except that within the pure information is the information that there is the phantasy/manifestation that something external to the information hence you have to take it into account because it cannot be dialectically over come, it just reemerges in molten cores etc.

Pneuminosity says something like even in our infantile beginnings we float in pneuma, we are then taught how to accrete it and we do so naturally as pneuminous beings. Umbra is not a thing in itself because pneuma would be part of such a thing. Umbra is an unknown state that grants the possibility of radical difference to the pneuminous e.g. a pure undifferentiated state which when translated into pneuma manifests as this potential for discretion. Of course that is just a possibility as umbra cannot be described in itself. For us there is only pneuma and the idea of its outside which is the paradoxical construct of the externality to its which necessarily exists in some way as accretion.

OOO is confused.

I think OOO is confused. Why do I think that? I’m not sure I can articulate it all, it’s a nagging sense I get as I read Harman et al. The problem here is there is so much I do agree with and I see the project as a late phenomenological attempt to rescue things (objects). It’s informational interactions seems good, there’s definitely something I agree with there. But what are the problems: I think the lurking Heidegger interpretation is somehow wrong. This withdrawal notion has been (at least to me) misunderstood. But maybe that’s because of my Wittgensteinian (at least of a sort) position. I’ve always lumped the difference between present-at-hand and ready-to-hand as being basically the same as the Augustinian (naming) language picture and meaning as use.  I’m not the first to find this harmony and I won’t be the last and maybe its in making this identity that my OOO disagreement comes.

I cannot see how Wittgenstein can be escaped. Philosophy carries on fascinatingly after the Investigations and maybe not even pointlessly but what it must do is establish there being an escape route post-Wittgenstein. This I have not seen elsewhere (it is what I try to do here precisely because I see he has made a serious blockage). Cavell thought and maybe still thinks the ripples of Wittgenstein have still not landed properly and I can heartily agree with this.

Why is this? Well for me it turns on trying to articulate this notion of ‘meaning as use’ and what the implications of this are. I think it can only in a sense mean that contrary directly to the OOO speculation in fact there are no objects at all. I then have to immediately retract that statement because that isn’t true either. I have truly in this instance run up against the limits of language. Do we have to remain silent? No not at all, its just that we have to try harder.

Why are there (kind of) no objects? Well part of it runs like this:

If the meaning of a word is its usage then it never actually reaches out to anything. To think the words mean unique pieces of the putative outside is a mistaken understanding of how language is working. This is true at least, if some kind of continuing spatio-temporality is true.  In the common place manifestation of spatio-temporal continuity (which I assuredly must acknowledge much of the time less I become an inert gibbering wreck), this point of awareness that I articulate with ‘I’ (I too is a use term) does various things, and can see various objects. Can’t it? The grammar, the rules that I use for this world that I find ‘myself’ in need a word like objects, at least for the kind of creature I am. I recognize various separate things, things that I can lift, things that I can’t, different regions in this ‘world’. I am taught a word in a context and I apply the rule for it as best as I understand it. If I had two identical contexts with some discoverable difference later down the line I would use the same word for them. I wouldn’t be wrong because the matter isn’t sorted by this later to be discovered ontological criterion (which would mean there was a thing that was determining the meaning). Indeed if that indiscernible difference is never discerned the that’s just what the word means. Words don’t designate, they are just use terms. This applies to meta-terms like objects. It sounds confusing because it makes you make nonsensical statements like ‘there are no objects’ when you can blatantly see there are. This is a grammatical confusion. ‘There are objects’ is a grammatical sentence that makes perfect sense but its just a use term in the meta-context of being-in-a-world. Object exerts such a powerful effect precisely because no one can say very well what the grammar of ‘object’ is. What is the grammar of the copula ‘are’? Obviously that’s a big question, but you could answer by saying simply that it is those instances in which we wish to link use terms in a certain nested way (this is this).

OOO wants to escape Kant and Heidegger but I don’t think you can, or at least not by that route. These grammatical objects might have no identity outside of the our being.  It is a coherent manifestation to say that we make the discretion and contemplating their external to us existence as if they were persisted discretely is not necessary.

Meillasoux comes upon the same problem: You don’t know that our awareness isn’t having an effect upon what ever it is that’s out there (note I’m not saying you don’t know awareness isn’t having an effect on objects, as actually they’re quite keed on that. I’m playing with the manifestation of our kind of awareness having a particular kind of effect on things, a reifying kind of effect and yes this does need expanding on). To be fair, OOO is called speculative philosophy and isn’t claiming a rigorous foundation ( I hope not anyway). But now you wonder ‘what am I talking about? I was on about Wittgenstein and now I’m saying something very very unWittgensteinian?

Yes, it’s a problem isn’t it.  This answer relates to the paranormal parts of the discussion herein. The synchronicity argument takes the inference to be that in the manifestation in which the synchronicity obtains information itself must have effected the putative ‘external world’. The ladies dream brought the scarab beetle out of the dream world.

There is a grammar of weird that is cogent precisely because we don’t know things like ‘what being is like outside of our perception’. If we knew that in a strong sense we could dismiss this grammar yet the manifestation of the paranormal, information interfering with solidity world persists. This persistence guarantees the grammatical application.

If you stay with the informational interference manifestation then you must in some sense be tied to a kind of idealism. There is is the notion of the externality but everything you that is about you is equally a concept.

Now the problem is: If there are no objects, the words don’t designate, then how does the informational interference obtain? And now we can return to a state in which I agree with OOO. Accepting the paranormal manifestation, words actually reach out to something. This something unlike in OOO is not an object talking to other objects in its disclosure withdrawal, but it is an accretion of informational substance that I have called pneuma. There is as stated, the idea of externality (which I have called umbra) but pneuma is all we can experience because we must conceptualise (we have no choice). Is it a duck or a rabbit? the flipping is a pneuminous flip, a different accretion is exposed.

The manifestation of the umbratic solidity is strong, is suggests its presence. Pneuma affects umbra under certain circumstances ill understood (magick). Use terms, readiness to hand terms create their accretive correlate. As pure use, there is no object, just a meta-term.

As pneuminous accretion there is a something that can be uniquely or generally designated. OOO in my opinion is studying accretions, and within a certain framework we can make these imaginings. However without certainty of the strength of affect the perceiving being is having granting these objects autonomy as objects is a manifestation that needs a hefty presupposition (I know I know speculative) to get it going. There is more to it than this but this is a stab at articulation.

Manifestationism 0.1

Manifestationism says the manifestations continue even if there is something objective underneath. This is why it is a product of the synchronicity argument. The synchronicity argument says you cannot remove the appearance of the paranormal world by appeal to saying some putatively object ontology holds. This not possible precisely because the appearance suggests exactly that said ontology does not obtain.

Manifestationism is a wider meta-philosophical strategy that extends this point. It says that all of these philosophical appearances persist in various competing ways. This a pro and against dialectics. Warring manifestations will generate new manifestations. This however does not entail that the previous incarnations have gone, rather these pneuminous creatures proliferate, accreting to each other in dubious alliances to take control of the endless turmoil that is the pneuminous territory.

Phantasy-Manifestation-Agnostic Disjunction

Further to the attempt to untangle some of the various terminological threads comes the insight that from an accepted manifestation other manifestations appear as phantasies. So if I buy into a materialist manifestation then the solid world appears a phantasy and vice versa. Phantasy we will recall is an epistemologically ineradicable option repressed only by greater weight being given to the accepted manifestation.

Let us remember the notion of the agnostic disjunction as a helpful terminological description. The agnostic disjunction occurs exactly in a situation where the outcome is not decided definitely by any kind of certainty but rather only a preference for one option over another. The pertinent example in this work has always been the interpretation of synchronicity as either a solid world statistical possibility or a fluid world pneuminous interference. The impossibility of arbitrating this (and other similar disjunctions) is named the agnostic disjunction.

There is no perfectly clear boundary between a fantasy and a phantasy, but the general idea is that a fantasy is an engagement with something for which I have no grounds for believing might happen (I might become superman), whereas a phantasy is a possible way in which existence might actually be interpreted. It is incumbent on phantasies that they are able to demonstrate criteria for their acceptance to enable them to be competing manifestations. I did not previously spot the overlap of manifestation and phantasy but clearly the terms are related. To reiterate: when a manifestation is not accepted it is a phantasy in relation to the dominant manifestation. For example, a committed idealist has materialism as a phantasy and they spend their time trying to shore up the territory against materialist incursions.

Here we can see the relation to the philosophy of agency, but this philosophy is largely functional only under the pneuminous manifestation. In the pneuminous manifestation various accretions are vying for territory. Pneuminous beings largely taken over by certain accretions (idealist ones in the example) cannot actually defeat the materialist because both positions are incoherent (remember that one).

It sounds confusing and what confuses me sometimes is that we must remember that pneuminosity is a complete theory. That is, if from the agnostic disjunction you opt for pneuminous theory, yes you are still open to the phantasy of a solid world, but then you must also account for the solid world theory from within the theory.

There does need to be a better description of the dialectic of subject formation but its going to be something like this: Selves are accretions, they are constituted by other pneuminous beings. Pneuminous beings invariably have a self accretion of some kind (though it is not necessary that this is the case, think of certain kinds of what we call mental illness). The self accretion is course accreted to all manner of different pneuminous structures. Now accepting that a materialist would blatantly reject this explanation of things, the pneuminous description of such a theoretical adherent is that they are accreted to a solid manifestation of existence and supporting accretions. A reasonable question would be as to whether it is better to call the self accretion a kind of discrete name/body pneuminous form or whether the self accretion is incoherent unity of the name/body and its accompanying accretions (which would manifest as beliefs etc)? The latter sounds very reasonable in one sense as we might say, here is John, he is a materialist. The very predication instantiates that he is a materialist. But maybe we would also say here is John, he has materialist views, in which case the former looks more appropriate. Potentially there are different kinds of self accretion anyway,  some of which are deeply intertwined with political/religious/or otherwise views, and other kinds of self accretion where the pneuminous threads relation to its beliefs is weaker. This kind of multiplicity is possibly the best way to go with it.



Manifestationism 1.1

It seems incredibly hard to untangle pneuminous theory and manifestationism. Not that they need necessarily untangling as such but there does seem to be a problem that probably is concerned with the manifestations as they appear if one accepts pneuminosity and if one does not.

Let’s start by noting that pneuminosity is a manifestation, it’s the world showing itself as an informational substance (pneuma). This manifestation is shown by pneuminous interference phenomena. As soon as you have pneuminosity you also have the idea of its beyond, which paradoxically is immediately pneuminously rendered but is a special case. This is the umbra. The umbratic is necessarily never directly perceived but exists only as the idea that there must be something behind the pneuma: an ineffable remainder outside of consciousness.

In fact this does not say that the umbratic necessarily exists, it is a manifestation from within pneuminous theory. Pneuminous theory could  maintain that there is nothing but pneuma, this is a competing manifestation of the theory. However as pneuminosity is also compatible with the notion of umbra, indeed would find it hard to eradicate it, thus the umbratic is not to be removed. If we tried to say that there was only pneuma we would be in the position of denying that the pneuma might be overlaying something else.  If we do deny this we are left with how the pneuma supports itself as only information. That the pneuminous is not just passive in relation to the umbra is accepted, but that it is self supporting insofar as the bifurcation seems to be begged by the Kantian manifestation of being for us, which is not removable.

What the speculative realist tries to show is that absolute being as can be accessed outside of human conception.  This conception as a manifestation can certainly appear and seem cogent true, but what it fails to note is that what is equally cogent is the Kantian being-for-us manifestation. The argument between these two cannot be settle as without some kind of superior science it  is not possible to get past that epistemology. The we-can-know-being-in-itself manifestation can champ at the bit and point to all manner of physics and cosmological enormity but it still cannot bypass the possibility that all of this might be just how the universe appears to a being like ourselves and that even our most non-human seeming scientific measurements are just necessarily an extension of what is epistemically possible to us.

And that’s how it gets tangled because now I’m talking about epistemological problems that occur with or without pneuminosity being in the picture. For sure pneuminosity is a form a correlationism but it is a particular kind of correlationist picture. Pneuminosity entails that pneuma and umbra interact. In older language (the fit is not perfect) that secondary qualities affect the primary qualities.

To return to the notion that the pneuma is self supporting we note the following dialectic occurs. Pneuma as information, contains the idea of its own beyond umbra, this idea necessarily exists as an accretion. Thus the accretion of the in umbratic exists which as the pneuma is not passive means it is possible that the umbra is created after the pneuma as its perceived ineffable holder.

Manifestationism is just about pointing out that somehow different ways in which being shows itself compete with each other. We cannot even say about how we choose one as subjectivising the philosophy would already have selected a certain manifestation. The space must be left open.

There is being is still not unreasonable. Its disclosure is its manifestation. It all sounds quite Heidegger when it is phrased this way. It can be argued that the statement ‘there is being’ has gone too far of course. This argument turns on whether being can be said to connote. In  pneuminosity of course being has indeed accreted to Heidegger. But if being were just to be said to mean that some kind of existence obtains it would seem relatively uncontroversial, maybe.


Terminology and Review

Let us reconsider the matter in the endless process of reflection that is philosophy. Let us also introduce the term pneuminous interference to accrete around what was previously termed ‘synchronicity’. Pneuminous interference means the ability of the pneuma to interfere at the ordinary reality level to create the paranormal effect (like the omen/sign/message from existence). Let us also introduce the term ‘agnostic disjunction’ to mean those disjunctions that are generated with no reconciliation. The relevant one in this work has always been that the experience of putative pneuminous interference is either reconcilable as statistically possible (solid world) or forces the monad to accept an incoherent fluidity to being. The very nature of experience entails that one cannot overpower the other.

This phenomenon then has set up two primordial manifestations: solid world and fluid world. The notion of manifestations is very important. It sets the possibility of a metaphilosophy of disjunctive manifestations competing with each other pneuminously for accretive dominance. This accretive dominance can only be seen as the behaviour of the pneuma (it accretes) and not an active teleology. An active teleology would have to be dialectically fed back into the system. That is the accretion of teleology would be reapplied back to the pneuma itself as a further possible manifestation.

Pneuminous theory and manifestationism seem to be deeply tied together. Manifestationism just says there are many ways in which being shows itself. Not all of these entail pneuminosity. However from within pneuminosity manifestationism also applies. There is for instance the idea of an outside to the pneuminous, an inconceivable shadow part, incoherent yet endlessly remanifesting as a notion: the umbra.

It is from within pneuminosity that the manifestations become accretions competing for the territory (the picture described above). A decent question would be: how does the picture differ if you remove pneuminosity? Only on one side of the disjunction does pneuminosity apply, yet on the other there is still information. Arguably there is still something like pneuminosity, just in this instance it is limited to local subjects in a solid spatio-temporal existence and there is no pneuminous interference.

Part of the claim is I suppose that the disjunction is maybe not a decision but more of an experience. There may be an allegiance to the solid world but the alternative possibility is always there manifest to be repressed or not.

What is key is the first person experience as epistemologically generating some of these manifestations. Someone like Whitehead wants to remove the first person epistemological problems by making every event a point of view. This is fine but it ignores the manifestation problem and replaces it with speculative metaphysics. What must be acknowledged is that no mass scientific picture presupposing an continuous existence outside of first person perspective can adequately remove the epistemological baggage that comes with it, no matter how outrageous and ridiculous it might seem.

Unless mass science produces an outlook/philosophy that is not hostile to these manifestations, it will not be accepted because people can and do experience phenomena that make them doubt the continuous framework as exhaustive. As is endlessly stated (herein) the reality of these phenomena outside subjective psychology is entirely irrelevant as that just entails a recourse to the position that was initially disagreed with to dismiss the phenomenon in question.

To reiterate again, this is either ontologically important (because it turns reality is something more akin to the fluid world) and hence sociologically important, or it is sociologically important because pneuminous interference manifestations will continue to appear and give meaning to people.





Quentin Meillasoux: Discordian Agent

The philosophy of agency becomes more and more pressing as it discloses itself. The notion is the perception that philosophers, indeed all humans are agents for different conceptual agents. These have elsewhere been called manifestations. Manifestationism was more concerned with the competing philosophical positions and their disclosure. Implicit in this was always the notion that any kind of accretion has agents. Accretions that are ideologies/isms attempt to establish power through agents, as one of the beings that can accrete the pneuma, we’re necessarily a target (possibly the only target). These are the ones that are more interesting (philosophicallly) but of course these aren’t just materialism, idealism, empiricism, they are also communism, capitalism, conservatism etc. There are more too, there are all the religions, some of which have alliances with supporting philosophies. There is a ground accretion of the possiblity of God, of Gods, (monotheism, polytheism, worship of the old ones). The point being, once you loosen the connection of the ideas to the agents, you can see a picture in which the pneuminous powers seek to control the agents to dominate the pneuminous territory.

The contemplation of this idea lead me to thinking on Quentin Meillasoux’s thought. Not all of it (for now). I was thinking of the hyper chaos, the instantiation that the priniciple of sufficient reason is not necessary. It involves the conception of the Humean skepticism (which is an epistemological issue) of causation (we cannot make a necessary connection between cause and effect, only an empirical association), not as epistemological but rather as applicable to reality. It’s not that we don’t know reality won’t suddenly behave in some inexplicable way, it’s that it might really do so.

One point here that I want to expand upon at a later date is that this is very close to some of the things I say in here. What I would add is that the experience of synchronistic/occult phenomena exactly is the direct experience of hyperchaos. But then things ring in my pneuminosity. This philosopher advocating this hyperchaos is of course an agent as are we all. But who is he working for? The answer is right there of course. Meillasoux is an Erisian agent advocating the purest chaos of existence.  His ‘Quentin’ accretion might not even be aware it has being tapped in this way, yet surely it has been. Whether it makes sense to say he thought the Humean interpretation up or it latched onto his accretion, either way he has functioned as a voice for the goddess. If we needed further confirmation it is not difficult to find.

Quentin, is of course derived from Quintus, or fifth…