What we want to talk about is ghosts and their reality but true to form we must bracket ourselves to the manifestation of reality. The entrance of the ghost into the real has a strange sense of acceptability to it, more so than synchronicity in some ways. When people reject ghosts, do they say that no one ever experienced such a thing? If so they say that many people talk about such phenomena but non of them ever really saw or experienced anything peculiar.
A lady was speaking and saying how her dog was barking and growling and an empty corner of the room. Then she speaks more of it to inquiring voices. Her son has seen an old woman in the house and there is black shape that sometimes appears. Things have fallen of tables and towels off towel rails. A visitor has been to the house and without it having been mentioned started speaking about an old woman who is here.
Is this just a gibberish that comes out of the mouth of the lady reporting this story? From the rationalist’s perspective who has never been close to such experience the incoherence of the experience is somehow repressed and denied reality. But the grammar of ghosts is sound and historically very real. This of course proves nothing, but it is fascinating how something so apparently not-real persists as a topic people seem to be able to talk about meaningfully.
‘There are ghosts in my house’ immediately has sense, but what kind of sense? Should we say that you do not and that the speaker is confused.
This though must be wrong. It is wrong because it presupposes the that the falsity turns on the existence of ghosts, that ‘ghosts’ designates something. But ‘ghosts’ does not designate that there are any ghosts. In a sense, like in so many instances, logic does not function here at all -this though is not the glib statement it appears to be, this does not say melodramatically in the realm of the paranormal there is no logic, rather its says that where the proposition about the existence of ghosts turns on whether there are ghosts or not we cannot answer this properly because there is no way to adequately say what a ghost is (an instance of severe incoherent coherence insofar as at the simple level there is a passing-over of the word ghost which gives the appearance of its being-understood). It says only that someone experienced something they took to be something paranormal. Because of the φantastical nature of existence this belief might always stay with the monad (I once lived in a house that was haunted). The event has retreated temporally and in its original instance happened only within the immanent sphere as such came from no-where. A science that taxonomises paranormal phenomena and differentiates strongly between a ‘real’ event and a non-event is possible but a) this is not currently available and b) is still subject to the skeptical issues that the monad faces in processing rupture-events like these.
From a realist/rationalist we know that there can have been no real ghosts and only a series of incidents which lead the person to believe that this was the work of an intentional entity, a cold patch, an accident, a wind that blew fiercely. But now it looks a bit like a synchronicity. The incidents are conjoined in such a way that we interpret them as a presence and how are we able to deny this apophansis? Well to deny it we must be able to know that the ground of reality prohibits this possibility. But we cannot know this ground properly -in a sense strong enough to discredit an entity of this slippery epistemological kind- so we cannot outright deny the ghost its existence (the skeptical problem again). As such the positive ghost belief is a φantasy -as we have previously mentioned.
The φantasy can be disclosed in its possibilities. What we can do is describe the options available for its being? That is, we can consider the options that explain the phenomena. These are i) the psychological explanation ii) the souls of the dead explanation iii) other beings manifesting as the souls of the dead iv) a pneumatic accretion of some kind.
i) Says that whilst the phenomena were actually perceived, they were purely in the subject to such an extent that even if there were someone else watching they would see nothing happening (presuming here the instance of strong phenomena and not just circumstantial). We take this to mean the affirmation of the solid reality of existence and the prohibition of the possibility of it being a reality tunnel occupied only by the monad -and another alternate reality. Thus the whole experience is the meaning of the term hallucination.
ii) Affirms that there is at least the possibility that an aspect of the human form may become disconnected from the body upon the body’s demise and carry on some form of existence which is capable of interacting with the solid physical space (such as it manifests to the monad). This does not imply that the aspect has intelligence like the actual lived person -though it may do- it does affirm the φantasy that there is some connection
iii) Affirms that there is the possibility that there exist other kinds of autonomous entities which may -for reasons unknown- take on the informational content of a deceased person. This informational impersonation can also interact with the physical space occupied by humans.
iv) Affirms that the informational aspect of existence which we call pneuma, accretes in various ways to form the beings which we call ghosts. Note in the strong theory of pneumatic accretions the pneuma is thought to interact with existence in incoherent yet actual ways (as opposed to being a passive conceptualisation/means of grasping). The monad accretes pneuma of itself and of others. The pneumatically accreted phantom could in one instance be thought of as formed by the intentional structures of the monad. That is, possibly e.g. the bereaved self-accretion continues to form the accretion of the deceased so strongly that they persist in some ontic manner. The accretive theory also entails aspects of (ii) and (iii) for since the accretive theory says that the self is an accretion therefore the the disconnected actual part of the self from (ii) is the accretion liberated from the physical substrate. The difference here being a) a kind of being is given to the substance of such beings (pneuma) and b) the accretion is not constituted by the other but rather thought to exist autonomously. The subsequent question as to whether or not there is any other part to the non-physical separate (commonly called the soul) to the accreted self is of course another φantasy which cannot be answered furthermore it is of course possible that it is the accreted self’s ability to exist independently of the physicality which might give rise to the notion of soul. This thesis emphasizes the notion that whilst magick may be actual it in no way gives existence any more sense of meaning. The informational accretion of the self, we might postulate, only survives adventitiously.